Proofs
Theorem 1 (i) In the absence of failure, the optimal short-term contract is p 
(ii) In the absence of failure, the optimal long-term contract is any pair fp 
(iii) In the absence of failure, the buyer always prefers a short-term contract to a longterm contract. Furthermore, among single-sourcing contracts, the optimal short-term contract achieves the centralized system optimal pro…t, which we denote by b .
Proof. (i) In a short-term contract, prices must be subgame perfect. Thus, it is easy to see that in the second period the buyer will o¤er the lowest prices that satisfy the participation constraints of the suppliers, i.e., p for supplier 1 (since d 1 is known at the end of the …rst period). Recalling that the buyer must also incur a per unit switching cost of k if he decides to switch to supplier 2, we see that the buyer will switch suppliers if k + d (d 1 ) < d 1 . Thus, in choosing the optimal …rst period price, the buyer maximizes his total expected pro…t, b = max Note that the supplier earns, in expectation, zero in the second period, as the buyer knows the realized value of costs. Hence, the supplier is e¤ectively myopic, agreeing to any contract with E (p 11 c 1 d 1 ) 0. Thus, the buyer's optimal …rst period price is p s 11 = d + 1 . This implies the expected pro…t is given by (1).
(ii) In a long-term contract, the buyer maximizes b = 2s p 11 p 12 subject to p 11 + p 12 2 d 1 2
0. The optimal contract is found by solving for the binding participation constraint.
(iii) Follows from parts (i) and (ii).
Lemma 1 De…ne p 11 as the solution to
Then the buyer's optimal short-term contract consists of p 
The buyer switches suppliers in period 2 if
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 1, we have p
As in the no failure case, the buyer switches suppliers voluntarily if d (d 1 ) + k < d 1 . However, the buyer involuntarily switches suppliers if the …rst supplier fails, i.e., if d 1 + c 1 > p 11 . Thus we have a partitioning of the buyer's second period actions according to the realized values of d 1 and c 1 in the following manner ( Figure 5 in the main paper): in Region I, the second period price is d 1 + 2 (c 1 ); in Regions II and III, it is d (d 1 ) + 2 (c 1 ). Thus, the buyer's expected pro…t is given by (3).
We next use the following identity:
to rewrite the pro…t function as
Di¤erentiating this expression with respect to p 11 , we have, since d 1 and c 1 are independent and the joint density function is simply the product of the independent densities,
Since all costs have …nite positive means, it is true that lim x! 1 f (x) = 0 and lim x! 1 g(x) = 0. Thus, lim p 11 ! 1 d s b (p 11 ) dp 11 = 1. De…ne p 11 to be the solution to d s b (p 11 ) dp 11 p 11 =p 11 = 0 (if such a solution exists). As long as the density f is unimodal, the second derivative
) dp
is positive then negative, i.e., the pro…t function is convex-concave. Combined with the fact that the slope tends to 1 as p 11 becomes large or small, the pro…t function is either always decreasing or has a local unconstrained maximum; see Figure 6 in the main paper. As in the no failure case, the supplier earns zero pro…t in expectation in the second period, thus the feasible region is any p 11 d + 1 , i.e., any p 11 for which the supplier's participation constraint binds. Thus, there are three possibilities: (1) 
Then, the optimal long-term contract under the threat of default is p Proof. We …rst show that at optimality, supplier 1's participation constraint is binding. First, note that as in the short-term contract p
and supplier 1 accepts any contract with
Constructing the Lagrangean L with multiplier and taking the derivative with respect to p 12 , we see dL dp 12
This implies that at optimality we must have = 1, hence the constraint is binding. Then we may rewrite l b , substituting the binding participation constraint, to yield
Taking derivatives with respect to p 11 , we get
= 0 by the assumption that lim x! 1 f (x); g(x) = 0. Also note that, since f is unimodal,
is positive, then negative, then positive again, i.e., b is convex-concave-convex. Since lim p 11 ! 1 d l b (p 11 ) dp 11 = 0, the sign of
is += , i.e. b is quasi-concave. Thus, the optimal …rst period price is the solution to (4). Proof. (i) In the short-term static contract, p 11 d + 1 , so the expected pro…t is bounded above by
Recall that the upper bound on pro…t b is given by (1), and since
we have s b (p 11 ) b for all feasible p 11 . The expected pro…t from the long-term static contract is, as a function of p 11 ,
Note that
(ii) First, note that in the limit as k ! 1, the buyer's expected pro…t in the optimal short-term contract satis…es
There are two possibilities: either (1) 
Since p
it is easy to see that lim k!1 p 2 d , i.e., the contract is equivalent to a long-term contract without failure (since the buyer pays such a high price that switching never occurs). In other words, hence for very large switching costs, the long-term contract is preferred. Thus, either the long-term contract is preferred for all k, or there must be some k for which
Lemma 3 (i) The optimal short-term dynamic contract is p
(ii) The optimal long-term dynamic contract is any pair fp
(iii) The expected pro…t in each dynamic contract is equal to the expected pro…t in their static counterparts in Theorem 1.
Proof. Omitted; similar to Theorem 1.
Lemma 4 (i) The optimal long-term dynamic contract is p (ii) The optimal short-term dynamic contract is given by p
, where x is the solution to
(iii) The long-term dynamic contract is preferred to the short-term dynamic contract, and yields expected pro…t equal to the system optimal expected pro…t without failure risk.
Proof. (i) With a dynamic long-term contract, the buyer o¤ers p 11 = c 1 + 1 , p 12 = c 2 + 2 , and p 22 = c 2 + 3 , optimizing over i , i = 1; 2; 3. Failure occurs if 1 < d 1 . For the same reasons as in the previous lemmas, p
As in Lemma 4, one can show that the constraint is binding at any optimal solution by constructing the Lagrangean. Thus, by substituting a binding constraint into the objective function, we eliminate 2 and write the buyer's pro…t as
Optimizing over 1 , we have
Since g(x) > 0 for all feasible x, b is quasiconcave, and is maximized by 1 = d ( 1 ) + k, or 1 = . Letting 2 ( 1 ) be the value of 2 such that (5) holds, we have p
(ii) In a dynamic short term contract, the buyer o¤ers p 11 = c 1 + 1 , p 12 = c 2 + 2 , and p 22 = c 2 + 3 , optimizing over the various . Failure occurs if 1 < d 1 . For the same reasons as in the previous lemmas, 3 = d (d 1 ) and 2 = d 1 , and the buyer switches suppliers if
Supplier 1 accepts any contract with 1 d . Clearly there are two cases. In the …rst, 1 > , so
The derivative is thus 
> 0 for all x, the second term in this expression is negative for 1 , then positive for 1 < , thus
is either always negative (resulting in the optimal solution being boundary, 1 = d ) or has a unique zero in the interval d 1 < . (iii) The pro…t from the short-term contract is
Comparing this to the long-term contract's pro…t of b , we see that the di¤erence between these two is
hence the long-term dynamic contract is always preferred.
Contingent Transfer Payments and Loans
In what follows, we allow the buyer the option of making a transfer payment T to the supplier in the second period. The purpose of this transfer payment is to help support the supplier in the event that bankruptcy occurs at the end of the …rst period; that is, following a loss in the …rst period, if the buyer raises the total capital level of the supplier to zero or higher the supplier is spared from bankruptcy and may continue to do business with the buyer in the second period. See Babich (2006) for an analysis of why such threshold transfer payments may be optimal when suppliers face default risk. We assume that some proportion r 0 of the transfer payment T is repaid to the buyer at the end of the second period. If r = 0, then no amount is paid to the buyer; in this case, T is a direct operating subsidy. If r > 0, then T is a loan, some fraction of which is repaid to the buyer. If r > 1, then the buyer charges interest on the loan. For simplicity, we assume that r is exogenously determined (i.e., the …rms do not bargain over the interest rate or repayment percentage of any transfer payment or loan). We also assume that the supplier only repays what he can based on pro…ts in the second period.
It is easy to see that if the supplier does not enter bankruptcy, it is optimal to o¤er no transfer payment, T = 0. If the supplier does enter bankruptcy, then let T (y) = p 11 + c 1 + d 1 + y, where y 0 is the excess cash that the buyer provides in the transfer payment that raises the supplier's capital level above zero. Let R = min rT; Di¤erentiating the objective with respect to p 12 , we see d (s p 12 + ER) dp 12 = 1 + Pr (rT > p 12 c 2 d 1 + y > 0) < 0;
i.e., pro…t is a decreasing function of price, so the participation constraint will be binding. By inserting the binding participation constraint into the objective function, we see that the buyer's expected pro…t from contracting with the incumbent supplier in the second period is, after subtracting the cost of the transfer payment,
The y term in this expression sums to zero with the y term in T , thus, in general, the optimal transfer payment satis…es y = 0, implying
while the cost of contracting with a bankrupt supplier and providing an operating subsidy is d 1 + 2 (c 1 ) + T . Note that this expression is independent of r, i.e., it does not depend on whether or not the loan is repaid to the buyer. The reason for this is that the buyer extracts all of the supplier's surplus whether or not the loan is repaid, making the participation constraint binding; hence, if the supplier is to repay the buyer at the end of the second period, the buyer must compensate the supplier by paying a higher contract price. Since the buyer is already extracting all surplus from the supplier, he cannot extract further surplus, and his expected pro…t from contracting with the bankrupt supplier is thus independent of the magnitude of repayment. Thus, for the remainder of the analysis, we may ignore the precise value of r, and assume that the buyer pays a price of p 12 = d 1 + 2 (c 1 )+T to subsidize and do business with a bankrupt supplier in period 2. It may not be in the best interests of the buyer to support the bankrupt supplier. In particular, if the total expected procurement cost plus the necessary transfer payment exceed the total cost of switching to a new supplier, the buyer will choose the alternative supplier. In other words, if
then it is optimal for the buyer to switch suppliers. We now de…ne the following function:
which represents the value of the idiosyncratic cost d 1 such that (6) holds with equality for given values of p 11 , c 1 , and k. Since, by assumption, 2x d (x) is monotonically increasing in x, there is a unique value of ! (p 11 ; c 1 ) for each p 11 and c 1 . Implicitly di¤erentiating ! (p 11 ; c 1 ) yields
The curves dictated by ! (p 11 ; c 1 ) and d 1 = p 11 c 1 intersect when
i.e., when d 1 = . Because the slope (as a function of c 1 ) of ! is always greater than the slope of d 1 = p 11 c 1 , it must be true that there exists some such that = p 11 , and for all c 1 > , ! (p 11 ; c 1 ) > p 11 c 1 , while for all c 1 < , the opposite inequality holds. Figure  1 depicts this feature graphically in the case of short-term contracts.
Essentially, the addition of a transfer payment to the buyer's action space introduces Region IV to the diagram; there is now a region of the probability space for which it is optimal to subsidize a bankrupt supplier. In particular, the buyer chooses to support the distressed supplier if the idiosyncratic costs of the …rst supplier are small but the common cost component is high, as the …gure shows. In this case, switching to the second supplier is more expensive than helping …rst supplier avoid bankruptcy.
The following proposition mirrors Lemma 1 in deriving the form of the optimal short-term contract.
Proposition 1 With the option of contingent transfer payments, the buyer's optimal shortterm contract consists of p 
where T = (c 1 d 1 p 11 ) + . Di¤erentiating this expression with respect to p 11 , we have d s b (p 11 ) dp 11 = 1 + Pr (Region IV) 0;
where Pr (Region IV) denotes the probability of Region IV in Figure 1 , i.e. the probability that c 1 > and ! (p 11 ; c 1 ) > d 1 > p 11 c 1 . Since pro…t is decreasing in p 11 , it is optimal to set p 11 as small as possible such that the supplier's participation constraint is satis…ed, i.e., p
The following proposition describes the optimal two-period contract with contingent transfer payments. In the analysis below, we assume that long-term contracts are renegotiated if bankruptcy occurs and the buyer subsidizes the bankrupt supplier. This is re ‡ective of the fact that often, when working with bankrupt suppliers, buyers must pay court-ordered price increases rather than continue with the terms of existing (likely unpro…table) contracts (see, for example, the case of Collins & Aikman discussed in Barkholz and Sherefkin 2007) . We note that our results continue to hold even if prices are not renegotiated (see §3 of this appendix, which can be shown to apply to the case of contingent transfer payments as well) although the …rst order condition changes slightly (in particular, the expression for ! (p 11 ; t) changes).
Proposition 2 Let p l 11 be the solution to
Then, the optimal long-term contract under the threat of default is p Proof. We …rst show that at optimality, supplier 1's participation constraint is binding. Note that as in the short-term contract, p
, and furthermore due to the renegotiation of the long-term contract if failure occurs, the cost of contracting with a bankrupt supplier is d 1 + 2 (c 1 )+T (e¤ectively, regardless of the amount of loan repayment). Then the buyer's pro…t is l b (p 11 ; p 12 ) = 2s p 11 Pr (Region I,II) E (p 12 jRegion I,II)
where T = ( p 11 + c 1 + d 1 ) + , and supplier 1 accepts any contract with
Note that since the participation constraint of the supplier now considers two periods, the transfer payment T (and potential repayment R) are taken into account. Constructing the Lagrangean L with multiplier and taking the derivative with respect to p 12 , we see dL dp 12 = ( 1) Pr (Region I,II) :
This implies that at optimality we must have = 1, hence the constraint is binding. Then we may rewrite b , substituting the binding participation constraint, which yields
Di¤erentiating with respect to p 11 , we have
The …rst term is positive (since @!(p 11 ;t) @p 11
Note that in the limit as p 11 ! 1, the …rst three integrals converge to zero, and hence
) dp 2 11
= lim
Thus, as p 11 becomes large, d l b (p 11 ) dp 11 tends to be increasing towards zero, i.e., it is negative, and hence the optimal …rst period price solves the …rst order condition, d l b (p 11 ) dp 11 = 0. Finally, Proposition 3 demonstrates that the primary result of the paper holds: namely, long-term contracts are preferred if switching costs are high, and neither contract type coordinates the system in general. This proposition is referenced in Theorem 3 of the paper. Proof. (i) In the case of the short-term contract, by substituting the binding participation constraint of supplier 1 into the buyer's pro…t function, we see that the buyer's pro…t under the optimal single period contract is
Since T 0, it is easy to see that
The expected pro…t from the long-term static contract is
Again, it follows by de…nition that
(ii) In the case of the short-term contract, as k ! 1, we have
In the long-term contract, on the other hand, from (7) we see that lim k!1 p l 11 = 1, implying lim k!1 Pr (Regions III,IV) = 0, and hence
Thus, for large k, the long-term contract is preferred to the short-term contract, and the proposition holds.
As discussed in the main text of the paper, the assumption that any transfer payment is made at the start of the second period is key. However, if this assumption is relaxed, the results of the above theorem continue hold if one of several alternative conditions are met. We refer the reader to §7.2 of the main text for a discussion of this point.
Renegotiation
If the buyer is capable of renegotiating the long-term contract, then he will do so whenever the renegotiated price is lower than the contract price. Assume that during the renegotiation process, the supplier will accept any contract with non-negative pro…t in period 2. In that case, the renegotiated price is d 1 + 2 (c 1 ). The buyer then pays the supplier min (p 12 ; d 1 + 2 (c 1 )) in the second period, where p 12 is the second period contract price.
The pro…t to the buyer is thus
There are subsequently two cases: either the supplier recognizes that the buyer will renegotiate the contract (and hence takes this into account in the participation constraint), or the supplier does not recognize that renegotiation will occur. In the former case, supplier 1 accepts any contract with
As in the proof of Lemma 2, we may construct the Lagrangean L with multiplier and take the derivative with respect to p 12 to see that dL dp 12 = ( 1) Pr (p 11 c 1 + d 1 ; p 12 d 1 + 2 (c 1 )). This implies that at optimality it must be true that = 1, and the constraint is binding. We may then rewrite b , substituting the binding participation constraint, to yield l b (p 11 ) = 2s 1 2
which is precisely the same expression as the model without buyer renegotiation. On the other hand, if the supplier does not recognize that renegotiation will occur, then the buyer's pro…t is clearly higher than in the no-renegotiation case. Thus, the pro…tability of the long-term contracts is increased relative to the value of short-term contracts, and the results of the model continue to hold.
Normally Distributed Costs
Theorem 4. (i) The optimal expected pro…t under all contract types is decreasing in d .
(ii) The di¤erence between the system optimal (long-term dynamic) pro…t and the pro…t under the long-term static contract is decreasing in d . In the limit as d ! 1, pro…ts are equal.
(iii) The centralized system optimal expected pro…t is increasing in d .
tributed and the common cost component is i. In other words, k is smallest when there is low variability in the idiosyncratic cost term. This is intuitive, as the option to switch suppliers contains the most value (and hence shortterm contracts contain the most value) when d 1 is highly variable. (Note that the behavior in the above table appears to be non-monotonic due to the fact that there are various parameter combinations-perhaps unequal in number-for each particular CV.)
